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A PSYCHOHISTORICAL VIEW OF MR. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER 
Andrew S. Watson* 
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER. By H.N. Hirsch. New 
York: Basic Books. 1981. Pp. x, 253. $14.95. 
When the reader 'closes this modest book, the personality of the 
late Justice Felix Frankfurter no longer seems enigmatic. Using ex-
tensively published correspondence, articles, lectures, and judicial 
opinions, H. N. Hirsch takes us through Frankfurter's life in suffi-
cient detail to support solidly several major theses about the Justice's 
motivations and behavior. Although the details and references are 
parsimonious, they are sufficient to make out a good case. Hirsch's 
thesis is that Frankfurter was driven by deep psychological conflicts 
related to his concern about being accepted by the "Brahmin" social 
elite of Washington and Boston-Cambridge, even as he tried to 
please his Jewish family, especially his mother. As he struggled to 
develop an identity consonant with these conflicting social images, 
he made neurotic adaptations which themselves hampered his ability 
to achieve his much sought-after goals. 
Although Hirsch calls this book "an interpretative biography," it 
belongs to the new genre of "psychohistory," for in addition to using 
historical. materials, Hirsch uses psychological theory to interpret 
them. It is this aspect that will probably stimulate the major chal-
lenges to the book. 
In the past, professional historians and biographers have zeal-
ously attempted to rely primarily on "objective materials," which 
they would set down and allow to speak for themselves. They be-
lieved that this was the best way to avoid the distortions of their own 
subjective views. With the passage of time, more and more scholars, 
even in the "hard sciences," have come to acknowledge that it is im-
possible to eliminate the subjectivity of the observer. The only way 
to minimize or eliminate this kind of distortion is to develop a cogni-
tive awareness of one's own systematic biases. 
Similarly, it is assumed that the actors on the historical stage 
have their own well-organized psychological distortions. Hirsch ar-
gues that an analysis of these distortions can lead to a deeper under-
standing of their activities: 
• Professor of Law, Professor of Psychiatry (Ret.), University of Michigan. B.S. 1942, 
University of Michigan; M.D. 1950, M.S. in Med. 1954, Temple University. - Ed. 
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The central hypothesis of this study is that Frankfurter can only be 
understood politically if we understand him psychologically, and that 
we can understand him psychologically as representing a textbook case 
of a neurotic personality: someone whose self-image is overblown and 
yet, at the same time, essential to his sense of well-being. Because of 
delays and difficulties in psychological maturation - because for sev-
eral crucial years he could not decide who and what he was and thus 
suffered from severe self-doubt - Frankfurter, I will argue, was led to 
develop a compensating, "idealized" self-image in which he exagger-
ated his political skills and talents. His political style, which he applied 
throughout his life, resulted from that self-image; it emphasized what 
he perceived as his ability to handle other people. [P. 5.] 
Hirsch explores the "factual information" about Frankfurter from 
the standpoint of two explicit psychological propositions: (1) the di-
agnostic category of the "neurotic personality," and (2) the "self-im-
age," or what the author comes to call "identity." Hirsch also makes 
the implicit presumption, drawn from the theories of psychohistory, 
that all of an individual's behavior will reflect his psychological 
adaptive patterns in interplay with the several or many contexts in 
which he lives. In this Review, I would like to examine these pro-
positions to see how Hirsch uses them in reaching his understanding 
of Frankfurter. 
The principal progenitor of psychohistory as such is Erik Erik-
son. Erikson, one of the most elegant contemporary psychoanalyti-
cal theorists, set forth his main ideas about psychological 
development in Childhood and Society .1 The book presents a short 
psychohistory of Adolph Hitler and uses it to show how a personality 
is developed.2 Later, in "The Problem of Ego Identity," he further 
developed the concept of identity, using a psychohistorical sketch of 
George Bernard Shaw. 3 Soon thereafter he completed his first major 
psychohistorical work - a psychobiography on the life of Martin 
Luther.4 This meticulously researched p~ychohistory became a 
model of sorts and was followed by the psychohistorical analysis of 
the early life of Mahatma Gandhi.5 These books demonstrate that 
for psychohistory to be effective, the traditional historical research 
must be done meticulously and all of the established and verifiable 
information about the subject must be used accurately before the 
analysis of personality is begun. 
Careless research can ruin otherwise competent work. In 1966, 
William Bullitt published a psychohistorical study of Woodrow Wil-
1. E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963). 
2. Id at 326-58. 
3. Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 1 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC AsSN. 5 (1956). 
4. E. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER (1958). 
5. E. ERIKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH (1969). 
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son that he had written in collaboration with Sigmund Freud. 6 The 
historical research in this book has been heavily criticized and has 
provided an excellent basis for the argument that psychohistory is a 
frivolous and sloppy variety of scholarship. This viewpoint has been 
enhanced by the publication of Fawn Brodie's psychohistory of 
Thomas Jefferson.7 Most experts on Jefferson seem to agree that she 
ignored much historical material and greatly distorted other data in 
her effort to prove psychologically that Jefferson had sired a number 
of children by his slave, Sally Hemings.8 
The psychohistorian must overcome still mere difficulties. In a 
recent article, Henry Ebel argues that a historian's choice of a subject 
for study depends in part on his own psychological adaption, which 
can influence not only his personal life, but also the "objectivity" of 
his work.9 The work of Ebel's group stirs controversy among profes-
sional historians because it suggests the need for self-analysis and 
self-evaluation, activities that elicit anxiety in most people. (In assay-
ing the psychological objectivity of Hirsch, I must stand mute, for I 
know nothing of his psychological experience or training.) 
Finally, the data for a psychohistory are often difficult to collect. 
Although it has long been my aspiration to do some psychological 
analysis of judicial decision-making, the data needed to do it ade-
quately are not readily available. I therefore found Hirsch's study 
especially interesting because it contains a lot of the kind of inf orma-
tion required to understand the psychological processes of someone 
who cannot be interviewed contemporaneously. While personal let-
ters and the video-taped interviews from the Columbia Oral History 
Collection are a valuable source of information (and the author 
made good use of these and similar materials), they have all of the 
limitations that are imposed on an archaeologist who must recon-
struct a forgotten culture from the fragments of ancient artifacts. 
The important material not ordinarily available in most written 
records involves the emotional qualities and attributes of the person. 
Evidence about emotions does not totally escape the printed page, 
but more often than not it is heavily camouflaged. Inference-drawing 
about the subject's emotions is fraught with difficulties and risks. In-
deed, such an interpretive process inevitably arouses skepticism in 
most readers. A psychobiographer or a psychohistorian nevertheless 
p.as no alternative but to do it if he wishes to explore this vital aspect 
of his subject's behavior. 
6, S. FREUD & W. BULLITI, THOMAS WOODROW WILSON (1967), 
7. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON (1974). 
8. The historical material in this book was attacked devastatingly by Virginius Dabney in 
THE JEFFERSON SCANDALS (1981), and his analysis was supported by the preeminent Jefferson 
scholar, Dumas Malone, in 6 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 514 (1981). 
9. Ebel, The Psychohistory of History: A Symposium, 3 J. PSYCHOHIST. 259 (1981), 
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Hirsch does undertake this exploration, and in doing so makes 
important use of the theories of Karen Homey10 and Erik Erikson. 11 
But Hirsch makes one mistake that frequently occurs when there is 
expert psychiatric testimony in the trial of a legal case. He invokes 
Hamey's diagnosis of "neurotic personality" for Frankfurter and 
then proceeds to deduce that because Frankfurter "had" this diagno-
sis, he will or will not be able to perform certain types of behavior. It 
is like saying ~hat persons who are "schizophrenic" will manifest 
"psychotic thinking." Ipso facto, any thinking that such a person 
does will be psychotic and irrational. This is simply not the case. 
While certain of a schizophrenic's thought processes may be psychot-
ic, not all will be so. Instead of deducing certain things from the 
label, it is more appr9priate if the particular thought process or ac-
tivity is examined specifically in relation to the individual's capacity 
to carry it out. The information that would be used to arrive at a 
"diagnosis" should be used directly to make a descriptive judgment 
only about the behavior in question. It would have been more ap-
propriate, in short, if Hirsch had avoided concern about whether 
Justice Frankfurter had a neurotic personality. Hirsch should have 
confined his examination to Frankfurter's manifest behavior as it re-
lated to his psychological capacities and disabilities. 
The second concept that Hirsch uses extensively relates to the 
development of a sense of identity. Erikson states: 
The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence is super-
ordinated to any single identification with individuals of the past: it 
includes all significant identifications, but it also alters them in order to 
make a unique and a reasonably coherent whole of them.12 
We may see from this definition that the instrumental effect of iden-
tity upon personality is to provide an individual with a kind of or-
ganizing principle from which to make a multitude of personal 
decisions. Identity does not spring suddenly into being (nor does 
Hirsch say that it does). Rather, it is a process that takes ongoing 
experiences and slowly works them into the image of ''who I am." 
Neither is the image necessarily totally integrated and consistent. 
Erikson visualizes these stages of personality development as 
processes that are hardly ever perfectly completed. Certain pieces of 
personality and behavior may be kept apart from each other, remain 
unintegrated, and even be inconsistent with each other throughout 
the identity-forming process. He calls this condition "role confu-
sion."13 Thus, an individual leaving his adolescence may be closer 
to one end or the other of the spectrum between identity and role 
10. See K. HORNEY, NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH (1950). 
11. See E. ERIKSON, supra note l; Erikson, supra note 3. 
12. E. ERIKSON, supra note 4, at 68. 
13. E. ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 261. 
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confusion. I will note below some of the ways in which Frankfurter 
failed to bring various parts of his self-image together into a consis-
tent identity, and that failure will help us to understand some of his 
adult behavior. 
A psychological process that Hirsch frequently confuses with the 
concept of identity is that of "identification." Identification occurs 
when an individual unconsciously sees himself to be like another, 
and in so doing emulates and incorporates the behavior of the other 
into his own personality. 14 It is from these identifications that part of 
an identity is built up. 
Frankfurter made three powerful identifications during his 
young adulthood. They were with Henry Stimson, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Justice Louis Brandeis. ¥any strands of 
his character and identity can be directly traced to them: he revered 
and then emulated them. Unfortunately, he did not always use their 
skills in the same contexts in which he had observed them, so they 
did not always work for him. Additionally, when he later rose to 
positions of power and importance, he expected those who became 
his "followers" to act as unchallengingly as he had done with his 
own models. When he came to the Supreme Court, he expected his 
brothers to follow and take his professorial direction and advice, 
much as his students had done. He often prefaced his advice with 
comments like, "Long years of observation of the work of this Court 
before I came down here . . ." (p. 159). They demurred, and re-
sented him. 
As Hirsch elaborates upon his description of Frankfurter's per-
sonality, he relies on a developmental mode of psychology. Each 
phase in Frankfurter's life then becomes important in shaping his 
personality. Hirsch assumes that if we can once understand and de-
fine certain behavior patterns, subsequent actions or inactions will be 
comprehensible even when they appear contradictory. This ap-
proach follows the "psychodynamic" model of personality develop-
ment, and most of his theoretical references are from that source. 
Hirsch sees two principal factors as critical to Frankfurter's psycho-
logical development. First, he notes the importance of his back-
ground in the German Jewish immigrant community of Brooklyn 
with its emphasis on upward social mobility and on the importance 
of intellectual and cultural interests. The second important factor on 
which much of Frankfurter's adaptive activity was centered was his 
small physical stature. He was early and continuously preoccupied 
with his condition as a "little guy," and Hirsch vividly describes how 
he related to anyone he regarded as important or powerful. In the 
early stages of a relationship with someone important, he would un-
14. See F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 135-
37 (1966). 
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abashedly shower the person with flattery. If the person then failed 
to respond with acceptance or approval, he soon became the object 
of intense anger and bitterness. 
Throughout his career and especially during the Court years, 
Frankfurter was prone to be critical of his colleagues for doing the 
very things that were so much a part of his own adaptive repertoire 
as he tried to manipulate situations and people. In terms of ego-
psychology, such behaviors represent a kind of subservience and ac-
quiescence to the perceived power and status of the person being 
flattered. (With the flatterer there is also an incipient fear and an 
imagined exaggeration of the other person's dangerousness.) Those 
with this kind of outlook tend to divide the world starkly into two 
groups - the powerful, omnipotent, and omniscient on one hand, 
and the helpless potential victims on the other. This dynamic is 
largely unconscious and therefore goes unapprehended by the per-
son doing it, but "bootlickers" (a term that Frankfurter used fre-
quently) (p. 25) always hate themselves for being subservient. This 
hatred is frequently redirected toward the object of the flattery. 
Thus when Frankfurter was in the submissive and flattering mode, 
he could see himself in full agreement with and as a true disciple of 
the powerful person with whom he was relating. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, when he was in his assertive, professorial, expert 
posture, he could graciously "nurse" people along and feel good 
about himself so long as they accepted his nurture in the form he gave 
it. Let the person he sought to feed refuse to suckle or dare to regur-
gitate unbidden, and Frankfurter would become extremely angry 
with him, probably without much awareness of why he was shifting 
his ground. This inclination was so powerful, as Hirsch well de-
scribes it, that it sometimes made Frankfurter assume contradictory 
positions that greatly puzzled those who watched him. His "scien-
tific" liberalness thus could shift easily into truculent, obstinate 
conservatism.15 
Another ·aspect of these seeming contradictions relates to why 
Frankfurter changed his positions. Although he valued highly the 
idea that he did everything for rational and "scientific" (!.e., exter-
nal) reasons, Hirsch demonstrates clearly that many of his positions 
were responses to a drummer whose beat was audible only to his 
own inner and unconscious mind. Despite all of the powerful intel-
15. Frankfurter himself was intellectually aware of this problem. He wrote: 
For those wielding ultimate power it is easy to be either wilful or wooden: wilful, in the 
sense of enforcing individual views instead of speaking humbly as the voice of law by 
which society presumably consents to be ruled, without too much fiction in attributing 
such consent; wooden, in uncritically resting on formulas, in assuming the familiar to be 
the necessary, in not realizing that any problem can be solved if only one principle is 
involved but that unfortunately all controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at 
least an interplay of principles. 
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 781, 794 (1957). 
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lectual skill that Frankfurter could muster, he, like most of us, did 
not adequately understand some of the conflicting forces that oper-
ated within himself. One person who was well aware of these con-
flicts was his wife, Marion, who apparently tried often to get him to 
be more sensitive to her emotional needs and complexities. In his 
letters he occasionally and defensiveiy comments about how his self-
awareness had increased and he states hopefully that Marion will be 
surprised at his increasing sensitivity. However, I very much doubt 
that he ever did become substantially more aware of himself, at least 
in the way that he (and she) hoped for.1 6 
These last comments recall to mind an interesting point made by 
Arthur Koestler in The Trail of the .Dinosaur and Other Essays .11 He 
notes that La Fontaine did not properly end his fable of "The Fox 
and the Grapes." It should have been that after the fox said the 
grapes were sour, all the other foxes went off to the local henhouse to 
have a ball. The fox who called the grapes sour nevertheless contin-
ued to struggle to climb the tree. Night after night he returned and 
repeated his attempts. One night, he actually got up into the tree 
and, grabbing a large bunch of grapes, bit into them and discovered 
to his dismay that they were sour. He wanted to go and tell the rest 
of the foxes that the grapes were in fact sour, but he knew they 
would not listen to him because foxes cannot climb trees! Rather 
than turning to new trees to test other grapes, the poor fox could be 
seen returning to the same tree night after night to taste the same 
sour grapes. In fact, in the end he died from a perforated ulcer 
caused by the sour grapes. 
This is a very keen insight about human behavior. Although 
human beings learn many things in the context of rationalizations, 18 
the process is in many respects imperfect. A new skill is often not 
useful in new and di.ff erent situations simply because the person who 
has acquired it cannot control it. The person is continually dragged 
unwittingly back to an inappropriate and ineffective use of the skill 
because a part of his memory is unconsciously attached to the con-
text where the skill was developed (which included an erroneous as-
sumption). It is as if the mind cannot recognize that the original 
rationalization has been tested and found to be wrong, or that a new 
skill has been developed that could be used in other and different 
ways. 
Many people are trapped exactly as the fox was, and Hirsch gives 
16. P. 49. Mrs. Frankfurter notes that he is "as remote as the alps." There are similar 
comments at pp. 50, 58. At p. 60, Hirsch quotes a letter to Marion in which Frankfurter says, 
"[I]fyou knew what such glimpses of your own griefs, your sense ofmy inadequacy, do to me 
-well you might believe that I'm learning some things." Such tensions were to exist through-
out their marriage. 
17. A. KOESTLER, THE TRAIL OF THE DINOSAUR AND OTHER EsSAYS 92-93 (1955). 
18. See 0. ENGLISH & s. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 66 (1957). 
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many examples of Frankfurter's being caught in such a trap. Frank-
furter did develop great leadership capacity but did not always have 
the power to dominate. In his several identifications with great and 
powerful people, he observed that they could assert great personal 
influence upon others, but he apparently did not "see" that theirs 
was a persuasive and not a dominating power. Stimson, Brandeis, 
and Holmes all could relate politically and personally to their col-
leagues even when they disagreed. This enabled their influence to 
grow rather than diminish over time. Because Frankfurter did not 
fully comprehend all of the psychological qualities of his models -
and also because of his own powerful wish to dominate and be the 
"big one" among men - he, like the fox, failed to take into account 
several important limitations of his growing skills. 
As Hirsch discusses the concept of identity formation he tends to 
imply that identity is made up largely of positive qualities from the 
point of view of social values. This is not the case. It may also in-
clude negative structures that, in fact, are psychologically flawed and 
therefore carry with them the omnipresent potential for failure. It 
appears that in many respects Frankfurter never had a truly realistic 
and accurate evaluation of his own capacities incorporated into his 
identity structure. Some of his self-concepts were assertions dedi-
cated to reassuring himself that "I am not a little guy; I'm a big, 
strong, powerful individual." This smacks of the defense called "re-
action formation." 19 Whenever he struck an interpersonal obstacle, 
instead of being able to see it in full perspective, it was as though he 
was once more confronted with his fearful little boy self. He would 
literally have to destroy the obstacle to reassure himself that he was 
big, competent, strong, and in control. This entailed wheeling out 
his heaviest barrage of sarcasm and vitriolic characterization, which 
nearly always increased the likelihood of alienation and failure. In-
stead of the smooth, diplomatic "manager" of things he hoped to be, 
he was often isolated and ineffective. In the end, his colleagues sim-
ply tuned him out. Hirsch notes many examples of this: It takes 
little imagination to see that this process of alienation must have pro-
duced a great sense of helpless impotence and despair in Frank-
furter. One gathers that this same dynamic occurred between 
Frankfurter and his wife, and that, too, would have fed back into his 
omnipresent fear that he would not be accepted by the world at large 
but rather would be relegated to the position of the rejected Jew. 
Although there is clearly a shortage of material with which to 
explore the early developmental stages of Frankfurter's personality, 
there is a great deal of information about his adult life. Yet Hirsch 
19. A reaction formation is ''the setting up of a more or less rigid attitude or character trait 
which will serve as a means of preventing the emergence of a painful or undesirable attitude or 
trait, usually of the opposite type." See id at 61. 
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largely confines his psychological analysis to the stage of identity de-
velopment that occurs during adolescence. There are other Erik-
sonian theoretical concepts that he might have used fruitfully. For 
example, during ''young adulthood" (in terms of Erikson's "develop-
mental stages") the ego adaptive qualities that evolve are either "in-
timacy" or "isolation."20 The biographical details of Frankfurter's 
life provide many clear examples of difficulty across this spectrum. 
Instead of developing personal relationships that moved progres-
sively toward closeness and intimacy - relationships that reflected 
deeply felt concerns about another person, such as a loving interest 
in Marion's problems instead of the mere appearance of being a 
good husband - he seems to have engaged almost exclusively in 
more self-serving activities, such as power-brokering or appearing 
paternal. According to Erikson's theory, people act this way because 
of their failure to develop a solid identity, which in turn would lead 
to a disinclination to take the psychological risks involved in 
intimacy. 
With the disabilities stemming from failure in the "adolescent" 
and "young adult" stages, further developmental skewing during the 
"adulthood" stage would push the ego away from "generativity" in 
the direction of "stagnation."21 While Frankfurter certainly pro-
duced a great deal of work, there is at least some impression that his 
ideas did not continue to develop as all had anticipated. Instead of 
coming to their full growth and flower, they seem to have become 
fixed and ultimately stunted, as though they had failed to receive 
some vital nutrient from their surroundings. Hirsch might have 
more effectively explored these aspects of Frankfurter's later devel-
opment by using more of Erikson's theories. Frankfurter's failure to 
develop a well articulated identity clearly did impose limitations on 
his personality, but by using the materials from Frankfurter's later 
years that he had at hand, Hirsch might have carried out a better and 
more rounded analysis that would have deepened our understanding 
about his subject. 
Reading Hirsch's description of Frankfurter recalled a vivid and 
very unpleasant encounter that I had with Justice Frankfurter. It 
occurred when Frankfurter presented his Owen J. Roberts lecture at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School.22 In the course of a 
faculty reception I was introduced to him. That encounter lives viv-
idly in my memory as one of the most unpleasant social encounters 
of my life. There was no particular reason why Justice Frankfurter 
should have had any image of me whatsoever since I was a nearly 
new arrival in the law school world. The only two real stimuli (un-
20. E. ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 263-66. 
21. Id. at 266-68. 
22. Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 781. This occurred on March 20, 1957. 
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less we assume that Frankfurter was in possession of some kind of 
psychic omniscience) that may have spurred a reaction in him were 
(1) although I did not exactly tower over him, I was at least a head 
and a half taller than he, and (2) I was introduced as a psychiatrist 
(probably in those days with the faculty ')oke," "This is the faculty 
psychiatrist!"). His response to me, lightning fast, was that I obvi-
ously did not warrant any kind of attention from him, and after a 
brusque "How do you do," he sharply turned away from me. 
Hirsch's description of how Frankfurter was strongly inclined to 
make swift judgments about a person's capacities, and then treat the 
person as one to be regarded with either respect or disdain (p. 43), 
made me better understand how Frankfurter had behaved with me. 
I also recall being struck by the fact that when he arrived, he was 
accompanied by a group of younger men who obviously looked 
upon him with adulation and reverence. This was in marked con-
trast with other Supreme Court Justices who visited our school and 
whose arrivals were nearly inconspicuous. Frankfurter clearly flour-
ished on such attention and Hirsch helps us understand how much 
he needed it (p. 107). 
On a second occasion I met Justice Frankfurter in Washington 
when I was participating in a judicial seminar with the benches of 
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia. My memory of that experience is not so vivid, but I do not 
have any recollection of his having had any great interest in explor-
ing the psychological subjects that the group was examining. This 
was in stark contrast to many of his brothers. His lack of interest 
may have been related to experiences that he had with his wife's 
mental illness, for she and her psychiatrist (with whom he consulted 
several times) (pp. 84-85) surely must have discussed his own behav-
ior. It is possible that a suggestion might have been made that he 
receive help in dealing with his insensitivity to her. Hirsch's account 
makes it clear that Frankfurter did not have the kind of personality 
that would be drawn easily toward psychotherapy. Since these en-
counters stand out so vividly in my memory and are still, after more 
than twenty years, enmeshed in unpleasant memories, I found 
Hirsch's biography interesting and helpful. It . is likely that many 
others will respond similarly to this book. 
It is easy to dwell on all of the things that Hirsch did not do, or to 
comment on what he might have done, but this would risk giving a 
very wrong impression. Hirsch goes far toward clarifying much of 
the enigma about Frankfurter's behavior. It talces a large measure of 
courage to write this kind of book and the author deserves our com-
mendation for having done so. Although one may carp about some 
of the psychological trails that he followed, for the most part I would 
agree with his psychological conclusions. I found the book valuable 
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and stimulating, and I hope that it will encourage others to go for-
ward and use the analytic methods of psychohistory. 
